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Policy makers often promote trade liberalization  and openness as a way to increase living
standards and welfare in developing countries.  For example,  before the 1999 WTO ministerial
meeting in Seattle the U.N.  secretary general Kofi Annan and the WTO director general Michael
Moore urged developed countries to "extend  the benefits of free trade fully to the developing
world" since free trade enhances economic development and standards of living (Wall  Street
Journal (1999)).  Brazil, like many other Latin American  economies, followed  these policy
recommendations  and underwent  drastic trade liberalization  episode from  1988  to  1994 in
pursuit of higher living standards and productivity growth.  The reforms not only reduced the
average tariff level from about 60 percent in  1987 to  15 percent in  1998, but also changed the
structure of protection across the industries.  These drastic tariff reductions were mirrored in
increased import penetration  in most manufacturing sectors.
While empirical studies have documented that the Brazilian trade reforms have increased
efficiency and growth  (see Hay (2001), Muendler (2002)), trade liberalization might have also
contributed  to the growing wage inequality.  Several studies  have documented growing returns to
educated workers  in Brazil that coincide with the timing of trade liberalization (see Blom, Holm-
Nielsen, and Verner (2001), Green, Arbache, and Dickcerson (2001), Behrman, Elirdsall, Szekely
(2000)).  Although the causal link between growing skill premium and trade liberalization has
not been established, this second development would be alarming for Brazil because  it might
translate into growing wage inequality in a country with extremely high levels of inequality prior
' Although  the theoretical  relationship between free trade and welfare is ambiguous, careful empirical work based on
cross-country data by Frankel and Romer (1999), confirms that countries that countries with higher exposure to
trade have higher living standards as measured by GNP per capita.
2  Growing skill premium has been documented in  Mexico and many other liberalizing Latin American economies
(see Robbins (1996), Cragg and Epelbaum (1996), Hanson and Harrison (1999),  Robertson (2000), Behrman,
Birdsall, and Szekely (2000),  Attanasio, Goldberg,  and Pavcnik (2002)).
2to trade liberalization.  Growing skill premium is also puzzling  because  many have expected that
the trade reforms would have lowered income inequality by raising the relative returns to
relatively abundant factor of production  in Brazilian economy, i.e.  the poor, less educated, and
unskilled workers.
In this paper, we investigate whether trade liberalization  has affected wage inequality
between skilled and unskilled workers  in Brazil using data from  1987 to  1998.  In particular, we
combine detailed micro level worker level information  from Pesquisa  Mensal de Emprego
(PME) with industry level data on tariffs, import penetration,  and export exposure to analyze
several channels through which trade liberalization might have affected the growing skill
premium.3
We first analyze whether the growing  skill premium could be explained by the
mechanism proposed by the Hecksher-Ohlin model of international  trade.  We test three
implications of the model.  First, is the growing skill premium consistent with the pattern of tariff
reductions  observed in Brazil from 1987 to 1988?  If tariffs declined proportionately more in
sectors that use unskilled  labor relatively more intensively, tariff induced changes in product
prices could have contributed  to the growing in skill premium by increasing the demand for the
relatively skilled workers.  Second, the Hecksher-Ohlin model would predict labor reallocation
from industries that experienced  bigger tariff reductions (and hence price reduction and output
contraction) towards industries with lower exposure  to trade.  We explore  this mechanism by
relating changes in industry share of total employment to tariff changes and other measures of
trade exposure.  Third, the Hecksher-Ohlin mechanism  would predict a decline  in the share of
skilled workers in industry  employment as firms substitute away  from skilled labor when skill
premium increases  after trade liberalization.  Our results suggest that Hecksher-Ohlin  could in
3Our methodology  follows closely the one used in  Attanasio, Goldberg,  and Pavcnik (2002)  for Colombia.
3principle explain the growing skill premium because tariff reductions were predominantly
concentrated in industries with relatively high share of unskilled workers.  However, the
evidence on the labor market adjustrnent provides little support for this claim.  T'he structure of
industry employment shares remains relatively  stable over our sample period and the observed
changes in industry employment shares are not in general related to tariffs.4 Most importantly,
the share of skilled workers employed in most Brazilian industries has increased concurrently
with the growing skill premium, which is not consistent with the Hecksher-Ohlin  framework, but
is consistent with a positive shock to relative labor demand for skilled workers (for example,
skill biased technological change).
Although we find scant evidence in support of Hecksher-Ohlin adjustments  to trade
reform, increased exposure to trade could have affected skill premiums by increasing the demand
for skilled labor via skill biased technological  change.  In particular, Wood (1995)  and Acemoglu
(2001) argue that firms might adapt skill-biased technology in response to intensified
competition from abroad.  We explore this hypothesis by checking whether the demand for
skilled labor increased more in sectors that experienced larger tariff reductions and larger
increases in import penetration.  We find that skill-biased technological  change was larger in
sectors that experienced  larger increases  in import penetration,  suggesting that skill-biased
technological change was partly an endogenous response to increased foreign competition.
Finally, we explore how trade reforms impacted industry wage premiums.  Wage
premiums represent the portion of worker wages that cannot be explained through worker or firm
characteristics,  but are attributed to worker industry affiliation.  Most previous literature has
concentrated  on the effects of trade policy changes on the returns to particular worker
4 Although the inclusion of import penetration variable  is not theoretically motivated by the Hecksher-Ohlin
framework,  we find that sectors that experienced increases  in import penetration contracted and  that tariff declines
led to contraction of employment  in sectors with higher import penetration.
4characteristics and the implications  of trade policy in the long run, where labor can move across
sectors.5 However, worker industry affiliation is crucial  in predicting the impact of trade reforms
in short- and medium-run models of trade.  These models seem particularly relevant in Latin
America,  where labor market rigidities obstruct labor mobility across  sectors (Heckman and
Pages (2000)).  If workers cannot switch industry employment easily,  short- and medium- run
models of trade predict that workers  in industries with larger tariff reductions  are expected to
observe a decline  in their wages relative to workers with the same observable characteristics  in
industries with smaller tariff declines.
The effect of trade policy on industry wage premiums has two important  implications for
wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers.  First, since different industries employ
different proportions of educated and skilled workers, changes  in industry wage premiums
translate  to changes in the relative incomes  of skilled and unskilled workers.  If tariff reductions
are proportionately  larger in sectors  employing less-skilled workers,  and if these sectors observe
a decline in their relative  wages as a result of trade liberalization,  these less-skilled workers will
experience  a decline in their relative incomes.  This effect is distinct from the potential effect of
trade liberalization on the economy-wide  skill premium.  Second, industry wage premiums might
vary across workers with different level of skills or education.  For example,  the more educated
workers might be more or less mobile in the labor market and might differ in the accumulated
sector specific human capital.  If wage premiums  differ across workers with different levels of
education,  and trade liberalization increases the industry specific  skill premiums,  this could
provide an additional channel through which the reforms affect the wage inequality.  Our results
5Gaston and Trefler (1994), Feliciano (2001), Robertson  (2000), Pavcnik and Goldberg (2001), and Arbache and
Menezes-Filho  (2000) are exceptions.  Arbache and Menezes-Filho  (2000) find significant evidence of rent-sharing
during trade liberalization  in Brazilian manufacturing  from  1989 to 1995 after they instrument for the value-added
with the effective tariffs.
5suggest that trade reforms did not impact industry wage premiums.  However, we find evidence
that sector specific skill premiums have increased proportionately  more in industries that
experienced  larger tariff reductions.  This evidence is consistent with the sector-specific  skill-
biased technological change that is concentrated  in sectors with larger tariff reductions and trade-
induced productivity improvements found by Hay (2001)  and Muendler (2002).
Overall, we conclude that the trade reform in Brazil did partially contribute to the
growing skill premium by impacting skill-biased technological  change and industry specific skill
premiums.  However, we find little support for Hecksher-Ohlin type adjustments to trade reform.
The paper proceeds  as follows.  Section 2 of the paper provides  background on Brazil's
trade regime, describes the labor force data, and overviews the trends in the returns to education.
Section 3 explores whether labor market developments in Brazil are consistent with predictions
of the Hecksher-Ohlin trade model and (trade-inducecl)  skill biased technological  change.
Section 4 analyses the relationship between industry wage premiums and trade reforms.  Section
5 concludes.
2.  Background
2.1  Trade Policy  in Brazil
Like many other Latin American countries,  Brazil pursued an import substitution policy
to shield domestic firms from foreign competition until the  1980s.  The high level of tariffs and
large number of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) severely hindered the access of foreign good to the
Brazilian market and provided high levels of protection to Brazilian firms.  The level of
protection varied widely across  industries.  For example, imports from the most protected sector,
clothing faced tariffs exceeding  100 percent, followed by sectors such as textiles and rubber that
were subject to tariffs exceeding 80 percent in 1987.  This suggests that Brazil protected
6relatively unskilled,  labor-intensive  sectors,  which conforms to a finding by Hanson and
Harrison (1999)  for Mexico and Goldberg  and Pavcnik for Colombia (2001).  In fact, the
Spearman correlation between tariffs and the share of unskilled workers in an industry (measured
by the share of workers with less than complete secondary education) is  .4 (p-value of .08) in
1987.
From 1988 to 1994, however, Brazil underwent a significant trade liberalization  that
gradually reduced its tariffs and NTBs.  The liberalization proceeded  in several stages.  In  1988
and 1989, the reforms  reduced the average tariff levels  from about 60 in 1987 to 39 percent in
1989.  Kume (2000) and Hay (2001) argue that the initial 1988-1989  tariff reduction had no
significant bearing on the exposure of domestic industries to increased foreign competition  due
to continuous reliance on substantial NTBs.  The NTBs such as import licenses,  special import
programs, and administrative barriers  to trade were eliminated  in the second stage of the reforms
that started in  1990 as the Collor government  endeavored to instigate productivity  improvements
by domestic firms through increased foreign competition.6 The gradual tariff reductions
implemented from 1990 to  1994 lowered the average tariff from 34 percent in  1990 to 11 percent
tariff in  1995.  The government partially reversed these trade reforms  in 1995  following the real
appreciation  of the real that lowered the competitiveness of the manufacturing sector and
widened the current account deficit.  Nevertheless,  the average tariff climbed only slightly
between  1995  and 1998.
6  Unfortunately,  the information  on NTBs is  not available.  This might not be very problematic.  First, unlike in
many developed countries, tariffs were an important policy instruments in countries such as Brazil.  Second, NTBs
are inherently hard if not impossible to measure.  The common wisdom  in  the field is  that the agencies collecting
NTB data take great care in making the data comparable across sectors in a given year, but are less concerned with
consistency of the numbers  across years.  This makes the use of time series data on NTBs troublesome.  Finally, we
control for import penetration,  which partially accounts  for the effect of NTBs on various labor market outcomes.
7This trade liberalization  episode provides an excellent setting to study the relationship
between wages and trade for several reasons.  Table  I reports the average tariff across 20
manufacturing industries  from 1987 to 1998,  the period of our study.7  The average tariff
declined from 60 percent in 1987 to 15.4 percent in  1998.  Second, the reforms changed the
structure of protection across industries, as different  industries experienced different rates of
tariff changes.  Figure  I plots tariffs in 1986 and  1998 in various  industries.  It shows that
declines in tariffs  differed across  industries, and that the dispersion of tariffs was significantly
reduced.  The changing structure of protection is also reflected in relatively  low year-to-year
correlations  of industry tariffs from 1987  to 1998.  For example,  the correlation coefficient
between tariffs in 1987, a year preceding the trade reforms, and tariffs in  1989 is .81.  The
correlation between tariffs in 1987 and  1995, the year after the large reforms were completed,
drops to .6.  The intertemporal correlation of Brazilian tariffs is similar to the correlation of
Colombian tariffs during the 1984-1998, but is significantly  lower than the intertemporal
correlation in the U.S. tariffs, where the correlation between post-Kennedy  GA.TT Round Tariffs
(1972) and post Tokyo GATT round tariffs (1988)  is .98.  This vast variation in Brazilian  tariffs
across industries in a given time period and across time provides  an excellent setting to study the
relationship  between trade and wages.
The above shifts in Brazil's trading environment are mirrored in the increase in the
import penetration  (defined as imports/(output+net  imnports)) and export exposure  (defined as
Tariff data was obtained from Muendler (2002) at http://socra.tes.berkeley.edu/-muendler/  and are based on Kume,
et. al. (2000).  The original data provide the tariff levels for 53 sectors at the nivel 80 industrial  classification.  We
have aggregated  the data to nivel 50 and made some additional adjustments so that the tariff information
corresponds  to the level of industry aggregation in the labor force data.  The reported tariffs are simple averages of
more disaggregated data.  When constructing our tariff series, we have also experimented with using nivel 80 import
penetration as weights, which yielded similar aggregate  means.  The correlation between  the two series was .98.  We
thus use the tariffs constructed  as simple averages  throughout the paper.
8exports/output) reported in table  2.8  The average import penetration  increased from 5.7 % in
1987 to  11.6 % in 1998.  The export to output ratio  increased from 9.7% to  11.2%  in 1998.
While the import penetration has almost doubled during this period, it is worthwhile  to note that
the import penetration  in Brazil continues to be relatively low when compared to a country  such
as Colombia  that liberalized during the same period.  Colombian manufacturing  import
penetration  was about 21% in  1984 and significantly  exceeded 30% after the  1990 tariff
reductions (Pavcnik and Goldberg (2001)).  This difference  could potentially be attributed to a
large size of Brazil relative to a country such a Colombia.  Moreover,  the import penetration
increases in Brazil varied significantly across sectors.  Figure 2 shows the evolution of industry
import penetration  and tariffs  from 1987 to  1998.  Industries with the largest surges in import
penetration  are clothing (industry 23), transport (industry  12), textiles (industry 22), machinery
(industry 8) electronics  (industry  10), and pharmaceuticals  (industry 20).  These are also
industries that experienced  large tariff declines.
2.2  Labor Force Data
We combine the trade exposure measures with labor market data Pesquisa  Mensal de
Emprego (PME) from Instituto Brasileiro  de Geografia  e Estatistica  (IBGE), the Brazilian
Statistical Bureau from  1987 to  1998.  The data set covers the 6 largest metropolitan areas in
Brazil: Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Porto Alegre, Belo Horizonte, Recife,  and Salvador.  These
metropolitan areas account for about 31.9 million people of the economic active age out of a
total of 79 million. Moreover, in 1997,  the states of the 6 surveyed metropolitan areas produced
8  Data on import penetration and export to output ratio was obtained  from Muendler (2002) at
http://socrates.berkeley.edu/-muendler/.  We made adjustments similar to those  for tariffs explained in  previous
footnote so that the trade exposure information corresponds  to the level of industry aggregation in the labor force
data.  We use industry level trade exposure measures that are weighted by the import penetration of the less
disaggregated nivel 80 industry data.  However,  the correlation between  the weighted import penetration series  and
the import penetration series based on simple averages is  .99.  Similarly, the correlation  between the weighted
export to output series and the export to output series based on simple averages is .99.
972 percent of the Brazilian GNP.9 Our findings are thus representative of the large and modem
parts of the Brazilian labor market, but do not necessarily  carry over to the rural economy.
Because we focus on manufacturing industries, this might not be very problematic.
The data used in this paper consists of people affiliated with any of the 20 manufacturing
industries.  We include workers or self employed working full-time (defined as working more
than 25 hours per week) between ages  15  and 65.  We use the data to create several variables that
capture worker demographic characteristics  such as wage, age, education, geographical  location,
informal sector of employment, self-employment,  and industry affiliation.  Our wage measure is
hourly wage based on monthly wage  divided by 4 times the reported number of hours worked
per week.  We deflate the hourly wage with the monthly national price index, IPCA.  All wages
are thus expressed in 1997 September reals. The main indicator for education is completed years
of schooling,  which is computed using an algorithm based on three survey questions on
education.  10  Based on completed  years of schooling, we classify workers into those with no
complete education,  complete elementary education,  complete lower secondary education,
complete secondary education, and complete tertiary education. 1  "  We also distinguish whether a
worker has formal or informal employment on the basis of "carteira  assinada",  a signed
workcard.  A signed workcard entitles a worker to several rights  and benefits regulated by the
labor market legislations, which enables us to classify whether or not a person works for a formal
establishment  that complies with labor market regulation.  The variable informal is an indicator
that is one if the worker is employed in the informal sector of the economy.
9  Source:  IBGE accounts of gross regional  products in current market prices. Brazilian GNP was R$  864,112 mil
and the six states (Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul, Minais Gerais, Pernambuco,  and Bahia) together
accounted for R$ 618,728 mil.
10  The algorithm follows the standard conversion used elsewhere  (see Lam and  Schonie (1993)  and Barros and
Ramos (1996)).
"Elementary education in  Brazil consists of four years of schooling.  Secondary education,  ensino medio, is
comprised of two parts, 4-8 years of schooling and 9-11  years of schooling.  Tertiary education  runs from  12 to
15/17 years of schooling.
102.3  The Returns to Education in Brazil
Prior to exploring whether trade liberalization has contributed to the growing skill
premium during our sample period, we summarize  the trends in the returns to education during
the 1980s and 1990s.  Using the same data as this paper (but focusing on workers in all sectors of
the economy rather than just manufacturing),  Blom, Holm-Nielsen, and Verner (2001)
investigate the returns to education for Brazil  from 1981  to 1998.  Their main findings  are
summarized in Figure 3, which reports the growth in the returns to education relative to 1982 for
workers with complete elementary education, complete lower secondary education, complete
secondary  education, and tertiary education.  These estimates  are based on the coefficients  from
earnings regression that controls for age, age  squared, gender, whether a person is self employed,
and whether the person works in the formal sector.  Several interesting finding emerge.  First,
workers with complete elementary and lower secondary  education have experienced a 26% and
35% decline in their return to education relative to 1982, respectively.  Second, the returns to
complete secondary education have not changed  substantially relative to 1982.  However,  since
the returns to elementary and lower-secondary education have actually declined during the same
period, this translates into a growing  return to secondary education relative  to the less educated
workers.  Third, the returns to tertiary education have increased by 24 percent relative to 1982.
Given that the returns to elementary and lower secondary education have actually declined, this
translates into an even bigger increase  in premium associated with complete university degree
relative to the return earned by relatively uneducated workers.  The above findings are also
confirmed for a sample of urban and rural workers  by Green, Arbache, and Dickerson (2001)
using data from a nationally representative  labor survey (PNAD).
11Given that Brazil underwent drastic trade liberalization  from 1987 to  1998, trade
liberalization, could in principle account for part of the observed increase in the premium to
skilled workers.  We explore various  channels through which trade could have contributed to the
growing returns to skill in the subsequent sections.
3. The Economy-Wide  Skill Premium and Trade Reforms
In this section we explore whether the rise in the economy-wide  skill premium in Brazil
is due to Hecksher-Ohlin  adjustments to trade reform or skill biased technological  change.  We
first check whether the Brazilian experience  supports three implications of the Hecksher-Ohlin
model.  We then exploit whether the evidence is consistent with skill biased technological
change that was potentially induced by trade reforms.
The Heckscher-Ohlin  model and Stolper-Samuelson  theorem relate trade liberalization to
changes in the economy-wide skill premium in the long run, when labor and other factors of
production are mobile across sectors.  Let us consider the predictions of the model in a simplified
world that has two sectors, two factors of production (skilled and unskilled labor), and consists
of a developed and a developing country.  The developing  country is assumed to be relatively
unskilled labor abundant.  When the developing country reduces trade barriers  on the imported
product, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem predicts that the decline in the price in the import-
competing sector will hurt the factor of production used relatively intensively in the production
of the imported good (skilled labor) and benefit the factor of production used intensively in the
export sector (unskilled labor).  According to this Hecksher-Ohlin  framework, trade
liberalization  will then reduce the skill premium in the developing  country.  This prediction of
the model seems to contradict the evidence from developing countries such as Brazil that have
experienced  an increase in skill premium following trade liberalizations.
12Despite this seemingly  conflicting evidence, we check whether the labor market
adjustments  in Brazil are in line with predictions of the Hecksher-Ohlin  theory.  We first
investigate if the growing skill premium is consistent with the predictions of the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem.  The increase  in the skill premium surrounding Brazilian trade liberalization
is exactly what the Stolper-Samuelson theorem would predict if the largest tariff reductions  (and
thus the largest reductions in the price of goods) occurred in sectors that employed a higher share
of unskilled workers.'2 Figure 4 relates industry declines in tariffs between  1987 and  1998 to the
share of unskilled workers in industry employment (a tariff decline  is a positive number  in the
graph).  The figure suggests that industries  with higher shares of unskilled workers experienced
larger declines in tariffs.  This positive correlation between tariff declines and unskilled labor
intensity of the industry is also confirmed in a regression of annual declines in tariffs  on the
share of unskilled workers in  1987.  The coefficient  on the share of unskilled workers  is 3.97 (T-
statistic=1.88).  These results suggest that tariff cuts in Brazil, like in Mexico and Colombia (see
Hanson and Harrison (1998) and Attanasio,  Goldberg, and Pavcnik (2002)) were concentrated in
unskilled labor intensive industries.  As a result, the Hecksher-Ohlin  adjustment to trade reform
could in principle  account for the growing skill premium in Brazil.  However, this is not
necessarily  the case.
We thus test whether labor market adjustment in Brazil is consistent with other
implications of Hecksher-Ohlin adjustments  to trade reform.  In particular, the model predicts
that sectors that experience  tariff induced declines in relative prices should experience a
contraction  in employment, while industries with increased tariff induced relative prices should
expand.  As a result,  labor should migrate from the sectors with the largest tariff reductions to the
12 Throughout the paper, we classify workers with complete secondary or tertiary degree as skilled.  All  other
workers are classified as unskilled.
13sectors with the smaller tariff reductions.  Table 3 reports the industry shares in manufacturing
employment  in 1987,  1992, and in 1998.  If trade policy changes would move r  esources across
industries,  we would expect low year-to-year correlation  of industry shares in total
manufacturing employment.  The correlation between  the  1987 and the 1992 industry share is
.99.  The correlation between the  1987 and the 1998 industry share is .96.  This descriptive
evidence suggests no significant labor reallocation across  sectors during trade liberalization.
We next investigate more formally whether labor reallocates  from the sectors  with the
largest tariff reductions to the sectors with the smaller tariff reductions.  In column  1 of table 4
we report the results of regressing industry employment shares on industry tariffs,  industry fixed
effects, and time indicators.  The tariff coefficient is extremely  small (0.00005) and statistically
insignificant, which corroborates  that trade liberalization  did not lead to a significant  reallocation
or resources  across sectors.  In columns 2 and 3 we also include lagged import penetration  and
lagged export to output ratio as regressors.  Although the inclusion of these variables is not
theoretically motivated by the Hecksher-Ohlin model, industry imports and exports might
capture the combined  effect of all trade related chamnels, other than tariffs, on industry
employment shares.  We focus on the additional trade exposure measures because  large tariff
reductions might overstate the exposure of Brazilian economy to import competition due to the
large size of the country and might not fully capture  the effects of reduction in NTBs that
occurred during this period.
Three noteworthy results emerge.  First, the inclusion of additional trade exposure
measures does not affect the coefficient on tariffs.  Second, there is no relationship between
export to output ratio and the industry share of manufacturing  employment.'3 This finding is
3 We have also estimated these regressions without tariffs as a regressor.  This yields similar findings  on the export
to output ratio and import penetration variables.
14consistent with predictions by Carneiro and Arbache (2002), who use CGE simulations to
explore the effects of export growth on Brazilian  labor market.  Third, the results  suggest the
contraction of employment  in industries  that experience an increase  in the import penetration.
The coefficient on the import penetration  in column  2 suggests that a .01 increase  in import
penetration in a given industry reduces the industry's share in manufacturing  employment by
.00 137.  Since the import penetration  increased on average by .076 from  1987 to 1998, an
industry experiencing  an average increase in import penetration  would contract its employment
share by .01  over the entire period.  Finally, trade policy changes  could potentially impact
industries with greater exposure  to international  competition more.  In column 3, we check
whether trade policy has differential impact on industry employment share in industries with
higher import penetration  by including the interaction of import penetration  and tariffs.  The
results suggest that a tariff decline has a larger negative impact (in absolute terms) on industry
employment  in industries with higher import penetration.  A  10 percentage  point tariff decline  in
an industry (evaluated at the mean import penetration  .08) is associated with a .002 decline  in the
industry's share in manufacturing employment.'4
In sum, the employment patterns over 1984-1998  are not fully consistent with an
explanation that would attribute the rise in the returns to skilled workers to changes  in trade
policy, operating through Stolper-Samuelson  effects.  The high year-to-year  correlations of
industry employment shares before  and after trade liberalization suggest that the structure of
employment patterns across industries remain relatively  stable over the  11 years surrounding the
trade liberalization episode.  Moreover,  we find no general association between employment
contractions  and tariff reductions.  However, tariff reductions are associated with declines  in the
industry share of manufacturing employment in industries with high import penetration.  Also,
14 In our data, a tariff level of 10 indicates a 10% advalorem tariff (i.e. .1).
15an increase in the industry import penetration  is associated with a contraction  of industry
employment.  Although the association between import penetration  and industry employment
shares is not theoretically motivated by the Hecksher-Ohlin framework,  this evidence suggests
that increased  foreign competition  might have partially affected the structure  of employment
across Brazilian industries.
However, if Stolper-Samuelson effects were the main mechanism  leading to the rise in
the returns to skilled workers, the share of skilled labor in industry employment  should decline as
firms substitute away from skilled workers when skill premium increases.  As a final check of
evidence in support of Hecksher-Ohlin adjustments, we thus compare the share of skilled
workers in each industry (measured by the share of workers with complete high school or
university degree) before and after trade liberalization.  The share of skilled workers in industry
employment in  1987,  1992,  and 1998 is reported in table 5. The left panel of the table shows that
2 out of 20 manufacturing industries experienced a substantial  increase in the share of skilled
workers.  The right panel focuses only on the share of workers with complete university degree
and suggests that 5 out of 20 industries experienced an increase in the employment share of
university educated workers.  Overall, table 5 provides strong evidence against Hecksher-Ohlin
adjustments to trade reform.  Firms do not substitute away from skilled labor given the higher
relative price of hiring skilled workers.  As a result, increased economy-wide skill premium
cannot be attributed to Hecksher-Ohlin  adjustments to trade.  The evidence  is however consistent
with skill biased technological  change.
Although we find scant evidence in support of Hecksher-Ohlin  adjustments  to trade
reforn,  increased exposure to trade could have affected skill premiums by increasing the demand
for skilled labor via skill-biased technological  change.  In particular,  Wood (1995) and
16Acemoglu (2001) argue that firms might adapt skill-biased technology in response to intensified
competition  from abroad.  In addition, lower trade barriers might make the importation of foreign
technology and capital equipment  cheaper.  Recent studies by Eaton and Kortum (1996,  1997)
model how the benefits  of innovation spread  from one country to another through diffusion of
technology or through the exchange of goods.  They find that the impact of diffusion of
technology on productivity depends on the proximity of a country to the technology  source, tariff
levels, and the flexibility of the domestic labor force.  Lower prices of foreign machinery  and
technology thus provide an additional incentive for the firms to adapt new technology.
To investigate  whether trade reforms were associated  with the increase in the return to
skilled workers via skill biased technological change, we regress in table 6 the share of skilled
workers in each industry against industry tariffs, industry fixed effects, and time indicators.  The
results indicate that the share of skilled workers in each industry is not related to protection.  In
columns 2 and 3 we also explore the relationship between increased demand for skilled labor and
import penetration  and export to output ratio.  First, there is no relationship between export to
output ratio and the share of skilled workers.  Second, the results suggest that an increase  in
import penetration  in an industry  is associated with an increase in the share of skilled labor in
total industry employment.  The coefficient on import penetration in column 2 implies that a .01
increase in industry import penetration is associated with a .0046 increase in the share of skilled
workers in this industry.  This suggests that an industry with the average increase in import
penetration  from  1987 to 1998 (.076), experiences  a  .035 increase  in the share of skilled
workers.' 5 We also explore whether increased import penetration  has stronger impact on skill
biased technological  change  in industries with lower tariffs by interacting import penetration
with tariffs  in column 3, but do not find any evidence in favor of this claim.
17In summary, our results in this section suggest that the increase in the skill premium
cannot be attributed to Stolper-Samuelson effects.  'However, our evidence is consistent with
skill-biased technological change, which was concentrated  in sectors that experienced larger
increase in import penetration.  These results suggest that skilled-biased technological change
could have been partially induced by changes  in foreign competition, so that trade liberalization
may have had an indirect effect on the rise of the skill premium.  Our results are similar to the
finding by Attanasio, Goldberg, and Pavcnik (20021)  for Colombia.  They also find little support
for Hecksher-Ohlin  adjustments  to trade reform, but strong evidence that is consistent with skill
biased technological change.  Moreover,  the evidence from these two studies  is also consistent
with the evidence on pervasive  skill biased technological  change in a large  selt of developing
countries by Berman and Machin (2000).
4.  Effects  of Trade Reforms on Industry Wage Premiums
4.1 Theoretical Background and Methodology
Since Hecksher-Ohlin model is a long run model of trade that assumes that labor is
perfectly mobile across sectors, Hecksher-Ohlin type adjustments to trade reforms can only
affect the economy-wide  skill premiums and not industry specific wage premiums.  Yet, this
assumption on labor mobility might not hold, especially  in the short- and medium-run,  and in
developing countries  like Brazil, where labor markets are characterized  by significant labor
rigidities.  Industry wage premia might thus also play an important role in labor market
adjustment to trade liberalization.  In particular,  as wve argued in the introduction of the paper,
tariff induced changes in industry specific wage premiums could contribute to growing
inequality between unskilled and skilled workers  if tariff declines  are larger in industries that
employ larger share of unskilled workers or if tariff reductions increase industry specific returns
18to skilled workers.  As a result, we next investigate whether trade reform impacted industry wage
premiums.
The theory link between trade policy and industry wages is ambiguous.  In a short run
model of trade and Ricaro-Viner model, where labor is immobile across sectors,  sectors that
experienced relatively large tariff cuts observe a decline in their wages relative to the economy-
wide average,  while sectors with proportionately  smaller trade barrier reductions benefit in
relative terms.  The above trade models assume perfectly competitive product and factor
markets.  Introducing  imperfect competition opens up additional channels  through which trade
policy may impact wages.  For example, in the presence  of unionization,  it is possible that unions
extract the rents associated with protection in the form of employment guarantees rather than
wages (see Grossman (1984)).  Moreover, liberalization induced productivity  changes may
further impact industry wages.  A large literature explores the effects  of trade reform on firm
productivity.  While in theory the effects of liberalization on productivity are ambiguous  (see
Rodrik (1991) and Roberts and Tybout (1991,  1996) for a discussion), most empirical work to
date has established a positive link between liberalization and productivity (Harrison for Cote d'
Ivoire  (1994), Krishna and Mitra for India (1998), Kim for Korea (2000), Pavcnik for Chile
(2001), Femandes  for Colombia (2001)).  Hay (2001)  and Muendler  (2002) estimate that the
1988-1995  trade reforms had a significant  impact on plant level productivity in Brazil.  As tariffs
declined,  firms had to become more productive in order to remain competitive.  To the extent
that productivity enhancements are passed through onto industry wages, we would expect wages
to increase in the industries with the highest productivity gains.  If these occur in the industries
with the highest trade barrier reductions, industry wages would be positively correlated  with
19trade liberalization.  Thus, theory yields ambiguous predictions about the effect of trade
liberalization on industry wage premia.
To empirically  investigate the effect of trade exposure to wage premia, we employ the
two-stage estimation framework familiar from the labor literature on industry wages.  The
estimation has two stages.  In the first stage we regress the log of worker i's wages  (ln(w,jt)) on a
vector of worker i's characteristics  (H,jt)  such as education,  age, age squared, gender,  geographic
location, an indicator for weather the person is self-employed, an indicator for whether the
person works in the informal  sector, and a set of industry indicators (Iijt) reflecting worker i's
industry affiliation:
ln(w,,) = Hj4Hf&  + Iyt * Wpj,  +Eqf  (1)
The coefficient on the industry dummy, the wage premium, captures the part of the variation in
wages that cannot be explained by worker characteristics,  but can be explained by the workers'
industry affiliation.  Following Krueger and Summers (1988)  we express the estimated wage
premiums as deviations  from the employment-weighted  average wage premium. 6 This
normalized wage premium can be interpreted as the proportional difference in wages  for a
worker in a given industry relative to an average worker in all industries with the same
observable characteristics.  The normalized wage differentials and their exact standard errors are
calculated using the Haisken-DeNew  and Schmidt (1997) two-step restricted  least squares
procedure provided to us by John P. Haisken-DeNew and Christoph M. Schmidt.'7 The first
stage regressions  are estimated  separately for each year in our sample as the subscript t in
equation (1) indicates.  In the second stage, we pool the industry wage premiums wpjt over time
and regress them on trade related industry characteristics.
16 The sum of the employment weighted normalized wage premiums is zero.
17  Haisken  DeNew and Schmidt (1997) adjust the variance covariance matrix of the normalized  industry indicators
to yield an exact standard efror for the normalized coefficients.
20Wp 1, = TJ,ifT + Dj,I/D + uj,  (2)
The primary variable we include in Tt, the vector of trade related industry characteristics,  is
tariffs.  In addition, to address potential concerns about omitted variable bias, we also experiment
with other controls in Tj 1, such as lagged import penetration,  lagged export to output share, and
interactions of the above variables with exchange rates.  The vector Djt consists of a set of
industry and time indicators,  which we include in our more complete specifications.'8
Since the dependent variable in the second stage is estimated,  we estimate (2) with
weighted least squares  (WLS), using the inverse of the variance  of the wage premium estimates
from the first stage as weights.  This procedure puts more weight on industries with  smaller
variance in industry premiums.  We also account for general forms  of heteroskedasticity  and
serial correlation in the error term in (2) by computing robust (Huber-White)  standard errors
clustered by industry.
4.2 Results
Prior to discussing our regression results, let us provide some information on the wage
premiums.  First, most of our estimates of industry wage premiums  are highly statistically
significant, which confirms that industry affiliation plays an important role  in determining
worker wages.  Second,  our results suggest that the structure of Brazilian industry wages does
not change substantially between  1987 and  1998.  The year-to-year  correlation in industry wage
premiums are very high, with the correlation coefficient usually exceeding  .9.  This finding is
surprising given the results from previous studies on Mexico and Colombia during trade
liberalization episodes (see Robertson (2000), Goldberg and Pavcnik (2001)).  Those studies
Is  We consider the use of individual wage data and worker characteristics  in the first stage a plus.  As Gaston and
Trefler (1994) point out, by conditioning our industry wage premium estimates on individual  characteristics in the
first stage, the relationship between tariffs and wages  in the second  stage cannot be driven by observable  differences
in worker composition across industries.
21found low year-to-year correlations of industry wages, which suggested that the trade reforms
changed the structure of industry wages.  The magnitude of the correlation in Brazil is in line
with the evidence on wage premiums  in the U.S., where wage premiums are very stable across
years (year-to-year  correlations are always estimated  to be above 0.9).19  The resemblance of
Brazil to the U.S. could be attributed to the fact that despite the large tariff reductions, most
Brazilian industries continue to face relatively low import penetration  rates, which is also the
case for the U.S..
We next relate wage premiums to tariffs  in the regression  framework described in section
4.1.  All regressions include year and industry indicators.  Note that it is crucial to control for
unobserved industry-specific  and year-specific  variables that could influence wages concurrently
with tariffs.  For example,  a country experiencing  a recession or macroeconomic instability could
temporarily increase its tariffs and might observe a decline in wages as people are willing to
work for less given the increased probability of being laid-off.  Without controlling for year
effects,  one would falsely conclude that higher tariffs lead to lower wages.  Simrrilarly,
specifications that do not control for unobserved worker and industry attributes that affect
protection and wages could induce spurious correlation between tariffs and wages.  Such
characteristics  could involve the ability to lobby the government  for trade protection, or
government's targeting of industries with specific characteristics.  If these characteristics  are time
invariant, industry fixed effects will capture their effects.
All columns of table 7 suggest no relationship between tariffs and industry wage
premiums.  While industry wage premiums are an important component of worlcer earnings, they
do not seem associated with trade policy.  Given that Brazil's tariff changes might overstate the
extent of trade liberalization (due to its size and NTBs), we next explore whether wage premiums
'9  See  Krueger and Sumnners  (1988) and Gaston and Trefler (1994).
22are affected by the alternative trade exposure measures.  We first estimate a specification  in
which, in addition to tariffs, we include industry measures of lagged import penetration  and
lagged export to output ratio.20  The results presented  in column 2 suggest that high export to
output ratio is associated with higher industry wages.  This result is intuitive since higher
industry exports likely increase the demand for workers in that particular industry.  However, we
find no statistically significant effect of lagged import penetration  on wage premiums.  In
column 3 we add the interaction of tariffs with import penetration  to the specification  in column
2.  The insignificant interaction coefficient  suggests that import penetration does not impact
wage premiums differentially in industries with lower tariffs.  Finally, exchange rate fluctuation
might also affect wages.  Although year effects capture the exchange rate fluctuation over time,
one would expect that the effect of exchange rates might vary depending on trade exposure of the
sector.  We thus interact the exchange  rate with lagged trade flows.  As our results in column 4
indicate, however,  the inclusion of exchange rates does not affect any of our previous  findings.
Overall, there is little evidence that Brazilian trade  liberalization affected the industry
wage structure and thus wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers via this channel.
This finding  is consistent with the evidence from Mexico by Feliciano  (2001), who finds no
relationship between industry wages and tariffs, but is inconsistent with the evidence from
Colombia by Goldberg and Pavcnik (2001), who find that tariff reductions  are associated with
declines in industry wages.
4.3  Industry Wage Premiums for Skilled Workers
20 Because trade flows are likely endogenous (they depend on factor costs),  we include  the first lags of import and
export measures in the estimation rather than their current values.  Of course, to the extent that these variables  are
serially correlated, this approach might yield biased results, especially  in industry fixed effects specifications  with
relatively small number of observations.  Nevertheless,  the inclusion of these lagged variables does not change our
conclusions  about the relationship between tariffs and industry wages.
23Although we find no relationship between trade exposure  and industry wage premiums,
trade policy could still account for part of the increase  in the return to skilled workers if tariff
reductions are associated with increases in sector specific skill premiums.  Industry wage
premiums could differ across  workers with differing degrees of education.  For example, the
more educated workers might be more or less mobile in the labor market.  Or, workers with
different amounts of education might differ in the accumulation of their sector specific skills.  To
investigate this possibility, we compute skill specific industry wage premiums by employing a
modified version of equation (1) that allows industry wage premiums to differ for skilled and
unskilled workers:
In(wij)  = Hj,16H + Ij;, * WPil + Ijj, *  SY,  4'WPsji +  EUt
The variable S,,  is an indicator  for whether worker i in industry j is skilled (i.e. has complete
secondary or university degree).  The coefficients  wpj,,  represent the incremental  wage premium
skilled workers earn in industry j in addition to the base wage premium in industry j wpj, , which
is received by unskilled and skilled workers.  By relating these industry specific returns to skill
to trade policy measures in the second stage of the estimation along the lines discussed in section
4.1, we investigate the differential irnpact of trade policy on industry wages of skilled and
unskilled workers, respectively.
Our results suggest that sector specific skill premiums  are in fact important.  Most of the
industry-skilled worker interactions  are individually and jointly statistically significant.  As a
result, we next investigate whether changes in sector-specific  skill premiums are associated with
changes in trade policy.  We regress the sector-specific skill premiums  in each year against
24tariffs, sector fixed effects, and time indicators. 2'  The regression reported in column  I of table 8
implies that industry tariff declines are associated with the increase in industry specific skill-
premium.  The magnitude of the coefficient  suggests that a  10 percentage point decline  in tariff
in a given industry is associated with a 2.3% increase in the skill premium to skilled workers
employed  in that industry.
This result might at first seem surprising.  Short run or medium run models of trade with
restricted labor mobility predict a decline in wages in industries that experience a tariff induced
decline  in product prices.  This argument implicitly assumes  that trade policy does not affect
labor productivity.  In section 3 we have found some evidence that suggests that skill biased
technological  change was stronger in industries that experienced  larger exposure to foreign
competition.  This would translate into higher relative wages of skilled workers in these sectors
and could increase their sector specific skill premium if the productivity increases  outweigh the
negative effect of tariff reductions on product prices.  Moreover, our results are also consistent
with the studies that find productivity improvements  after Brazilian trade  liberalization in sectors
that experienced  biggest tariff cuts (see Hay (2001), Muendler (2002)).  These studies do not
differentiate between skill biased and Hicks neutral productivity improvements.  If these
productivity improvements outweigh  the decline in prices dues to tariff reductions and enhance
the earnings of relatively skilled workers more than the earnings of unskilled workers,  they could
partially  account for the increase in industry  specific wages of skilled workers.
We perform several specification checks.  To begin with, in columns 2-4 we consider
whether other trade exposure measures  are also related to sector-specific  skill premiums.  Two
findings emerge.  First, the relationship between tariffs and sector specific  skill premiums is
21 In unreported regressions,  we also investigated whether there is a relationship between trade exposure and sector-
specific base wage premiums using the same set of specification as in table 7. We reach the same conclusions  as in
table 7. That is, we find no relationship  between base wage premium, tariffs, and import penetration.
25robust to the inclusion of other trade exposure measures.  While the magnitude of the coefficient
somewhat declines,  the estimates are still within the confidence interval of the coefficient in
column  1. Second, we find no relationship between sector specific skill premium and import
penetration and export to output ratio.  Moreover,  given that the structure of protection has
changed in Brazil during our sample period, one could object that unobserved time-varying
shocks, which may simultaneously affect tariff changes and sector specific skill premium, drive
our results.  We thus also account for the potential endogeneity  of trade policy changes by
instrumenting for changes in trade policy with presample  tariffs  and presample tariffs  interacted
with the exchange  rate.
Our choice of instruments  is guided by the institutional details of Brazilian trade
liberalization.  Kume (2000) suggests that at the macroeconomic level Brazil changed trade
policy in response to exchange  rate fluctuations.  Moreover,  as we discuss in section 2.1 of the
paper some sectors experienced larger tariff reductions  than others.  This is clue to the fact that
tariffs were widely dispersed across sectors prior to trade reforms and that Brazil was committed
to economy-wide  liberalization.  As a result, trade reform  led to proportionately larger tariff
reductions in sectors with historically higher tariff levels.  Figure 5 relates the industry decline in
tariffs between  1987 and 1998 to the pre-reform levels of protection in  1986 (a year prior to our
sample) and illustrates a strong positive correlation between tariff declines and the  1986 tariff
level.  Moreover, the regression of the 1998-1987 lariff decline on 1986 tariffs yields the
coefficient on  1986 tariffs of .8 (t-statistic  16.77) and R2 of .94.  This discussion  suggests that
the 1986 industry tariff levels, and their interaction  with exchange rates, are highly correlated
with the industry tariff reductions and may provide good instruments for the tariff changes.  We
estimate the relationship between sector specific skill premiums and tariffs in first differences
26using 2SLS.  The results are reported in table 9. The 2SLS coefficient on tariff changes is
-.0014.  Because coffee prices  likely affect the exchange rate,  we have also experimented with
the interaction of coffee prices rather than exchange  rates with presample tariffs  as an
instrument.  This yielded the tariff coefficient of -.002 (column  2 of table 9).  Thus we continue
to find that even after accounting  for endogeneity of trade policy changes, tariff reductions  are
associated  with the increases in sector specific skill premiums.
In sum, our evidence suggests that sector specific skill premiums have increased
proportionately more in industries that experienced larger tariff reductions.  These sector specific
wage increases  are potentially associated with skill biased productivity improvements  in sectors
that face more foreign competition.  They provide an additional channel through which trade
liberalization might have affected the growing skill premium.
5.  Conclusions
This paper explores three channels through which trade  liberalization  might have
contributed to the growing return to educated workers in Brazil during the  1  980s and  1  990s: the
increase in skill premium due to Hecksher-Ohlin response to trade reforms, the increase in skill
premium due to skill-biased technological  change that was potentially associated with trade
liberalization,  and changes  in industry wage premiums.
We do not find much evidence that Hecksher-Ohlin  type mechanisms have contributed  to
the growing skill premium.  While our results suggest that an increase in the industry's import
penetration is associated with contraction in the industry's  share of total manufacturing
employment, we find no general relationship between tariff declines and contractions in
employment.  Moreover, the structure of employment within manufacturing sector has not
27changed significantly during the trade reforms.  Most importantly, the share of skilled labor in
industry employment has increased in most industries despite the growing skill premium.
Our results suggest that skill-biased technological  change might have been the primary
source in increasing skill premium as the share of skilled workers increased in most industries.
Part of the adoption of skill-biased technology might have been associated  with the firm's
response to intensified  foreign competition.  We find that the demand for skilled workers
increased by more in industries that experienced a larger increase in import penetration.  Finally,
our evidence suggests that sector specific skill premniums were inversely related to tariff
reductions  (potentially because productivity gains associated with trade reform in these sectors
were passed on to skilled workers as higher wages).
Overall,  the magnitude of the effect of trade reforms on various labor market outcomes
does not seem very large.  This, combined with the fact that wage inequality has actually not
risen much in Brazil despite the rise in skill premium (see Blom, Holm-Nielsen,  and Verner
(2001) and Green, Arbache, and Dickerson (2001)), seems to suggest that trade liberalization had
22 only a small impact on wage inequality.  Our conclusion that trade liberalization played a
relatively minor role is in line with other studies focusing on Brazil (see Green, Arbache, and
Dickerson (2001)  and Cameiro and Arbache (2002)).  This could potentially be due to the fact
that, despite large tariff reductions, import penetration in Brazil continues  to be relatively low
due to the large size of Brazilian economy.  However, the results of the overall modest effects of
trade on wage inequality have also been found by Attanasio, Goldberg, and Pavcnik (2002) for
Colombia, and these findings differ significantly from the experience in Mexico (see Cragg and
22Both of these studies find that various wage inequality measures such as standard deviation of log wages and Gini
coefficient have not changed much before and after the trade reform.  Green, Arbache,  and Dickerson  (2001)  argue
that the wage inequality has not risen dramatically  despite the growing skill premium because college educated
workers continue to represent a relatively small share of Brazilian population.
28Epelbaum (1996)  Feenstra and Hanson (1997),  Robertson (2000a)).  Exploring these similarities
and differences  in labor market adjustments to trade reforms in various Latin American  countries
will likely provide a fruitful ground for future research.
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33Figure  1-Tariffs in  1986 and 1998
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37Table 1--Tariffs  1987-1998
Year  Mean  S.D.
1987  58.8  22.8
1988  50.1  18.3
1989  39.1  16.4
1990  34.1  17.0
1991  25.2  13.3
1992  19.1  10.3
1993  14.4  7.2
1994  12.9  6.2
1995  10.9  5.7
1996  12.5  6.6
1997  12.8  7.0
1998  15.4  6.5
Note: There are 20 industries in each
year.Table 2--Trade Exposure  1987-1998
Year  Import Penetration  Export to Output
Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D.
1987  .057  .086  .097  .112
1988  .059-  .085  .095  .113
1989  .061  .084  .094  .115
1990  .064  .084  .092  .116
1991  .076  .086  .109  .124
1992  .077  .088  .134  .136
1993  .080  .084  .130  .132
1994  .086  .083  .115  .112
1995  .098  .081  .110  .108
1996  .098  .081  .114  .118
1997  .106  .083  .117  .122
1998  .116  .078  .112  .101
Note:  There are 20 industries in each year except  in 1998, where we
are missing the information on two industries.Table 3--Industry  Share in Total Manufacturing  Employment
Industry Share in Manufacturing
Industry Code  Employment
1987  1992  1998
2  .0102  .0125  .0124
3  .0151  .0142  .0112
4  .0546  .0538  .0477
5  .1678  .1694  .1792
8  .0715  .0616  .0568
10  .0585  .0485  .0428
12  .1117  .1038  .1068
14  .0574  .0662  .0757
15  .0692  .0720  .0813
16  .0163  .0187  .0181
17  .0543  .0507  .0349
18  .0210  .0223  .0200
20  .0211  .0206  .0236
21  .0281  .0295  .0338
22  .0447  .0406  .0247
23  .0384  .0402  .0399
24  .0454  .0436  .0536
26  .0031  .0033  .0021
28  .0880  .1032  .1144
31  .0236  .0254  .0209Table 4--Industry  Share of Employment and Trade Exposure
(1)  (2)  (3)
Tariff  .00005  -.00002  .00000
(.0001)  (.0001)  (.0001)
Lagged Import Penetration  -.1370  **  -.1537
(.0574)  (.0463)
Lagged Import Penetration*Tariff  .0031
(.0009)
Lagged Export to Output Ratio  .0329  .0335
(.0236)  (.0221)
Year Indicators  yes  yes  yes
Industry Indicators  yes  yes  yes
Note:  ** and * indicate 5 and 10 % significance,  respectively.  Reported standard errors are
robust and clustered on industry.  N is 240.Table 5--Share of Skilled Workers in Industry Employment
Share of Workers with Complete
Secondary or University Degree in  Share of Workers  with Complete
Industry Code  Industry  University  Degree in Industry
1987  1992  1998  1987  1  992  1998
2  .373  .438  .356  .184  .165  .134
3  .257  .347  .280  .081  .084  .104
4  .150  .168  .180  .055  .045  .057
5  .175  .211  .220  .054  .060  .042
8  .240  .291  .380  .070  .084  .095
10  .316  .370  .440  .122  .142  .138
12  .190  .227  .333  .052  .059  .070
14  .087  .093  .130  .013  .012  .021
15  .254  .319  .377  .075  .095  .104
16  .225  .219  .190  .073  .057  .041
17  .402  .458  .487  .137  .139  .153
18  .624  .659  .739  .268  .259  .310
20  .391  .442  .538  .148  .118  .158
21  .200  .182  .256  .055  .036  .073
22  .166  .204  .298  .048  .051  .084
23  .132  .182  .190  .027  .032  .026
24  .080  .098  .133  .015  .021  .006
26  .408  .440  .514  .107  .160  .114
28  .155  .165  .220  .045  .042  .051
31  .215  .215  .378  .044  .065  .079
Note: Skilled workers are workers with complete secondary or university  education.Table 6--Share of Skilled Workers and Trade Exposure
(1)  (2)  (3)
Tariff  -.0002  .0000  .0000
(.0004)  (.0005)  (.0005)
Lagged Import Penetration  .4584  **  .4600  **
(.1585)  (.1599)
Lagged Import Penetration*Tariff  -.0003
(.0041)
Lagged Export to Output Ratio  -.0466  -.0466
(.1221)  (.1222)
Year Indicators  yes  yes  yes
Industry Indicators  yes  yes  yes
Note:  *  * and * indicate 5 and 10  % significance, respectively.  Reported  standard errors  are
robust and clustered  on industry.  N is 240.Table 7-- Industry Wage Premiums and Trade Exposure
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Tariff  -.0006  -.0005  -.0005  -.0004
(.0006)  (.0005)  (.0004)  (.0006)
Lagged Export to Output  .1959  **  .2199  **  .2096
(.0986)  (.0932)  (.0952)
Lagged Import Penetration  .1869  .1367  .2313
(.2504)  (.2219)  (.2721)
Tariff*Lagged  Imp. Penetration  -.0091
(.0105)
Lagged Exports*Ex.Rate  -.0304
(.0773)
Lagged Imports*Ex.Rate  -.0357
Year Indicators  yes  yes  yes  yes
Industry Indicators  yes  yes  yes  yes
Note:  ** and * indicate 5 and  10 % significance,  respectively.  Reported standard errors  are robust
and clustered by industry.  N is 240.Table 8-- Industry Specific Skill Premiums and Trade Exposure
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Nominal tariff  -.0023**  -.0017**  -.0015**  -.0013**
(.0008)  (.0007)  (.0008)  (.0006)
Lagged Export to Output  .0473  .1086  .0570
(.2476)  (.2536)  (.2480)
Lagged Import Penetration  .5724  .4986  -.1083
(.4132)  (.4155)  (.4035)
Tariff*Imp. Pentration  -.0120
(.0085)
Lagged Exports*Ex.Rate  -.2308
(.1784)
Lagged Imports*Ex.Rate  .4844 **
(:1472)
Year Indicators  yes  yes  yes  yes
Industry Indicators  yes  yes  yes  yes
Note:  *  * and * indicate  5 and  10 % significance,  respectively.  Reported standard  errors are robust
and clustered by industry.  N  is 240.Table 9-- Industry Specific Skill Premiums and Trade Exposure,  First Differences,  2SLS results
(1)  (2)
Nominal tariff  -.0014  -.0020
(.0005)  (.0008)
Year Indicators  yes  yes
Note:  ** and * indicate 5 and  10 % significance, respectively.
Reported standard  errors are robust and clustered by industry.  N is
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